Customer deposits have traditionally been viewed as the primary source of liquidity risk facing banks. However, research over the past decade suggests that customer deposits can hedge the liquidity risk stemming from unused loan commitments since the liquidity demands of depositors and borrowers are not perfectly correlated. We argue in this paper that this complementarity between the simultaneous provision of liquidity to depositors and borrowers is only possible in the presence of deposit insurance. Accordingly, we use IMF-defined episodes of banking crises over the last 25 years as shocks to market liquidity to identify the impact of deposit insurance on bank lending during crises. The results suggest that there is significant positive relation between continued loan growth during crises and whether banks have access to deposit insurance. Further, this effect is concentrated in banks relying more on core deposit funding.
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Introduction
Liquidity risk relates to a financial institution's inability to generate sufficient cash to honour its obligations without realizing extraordinarily large losses from early liquidation of assets. For banks, liquidity risk is a result of their asset transformation function and is part of their everyday risk-management. The classic model of banks by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) attributes the primary source of liquidity risk to demandable deposits because of their potential to trigger bank runs.
In contrast to this traditional view, contemporary research suggests that that a significant proportion of liquidity risk faced by banks today stems from unused loan commitments. Unused loan commitments represent promises that banks have made to their potential borrowers to provide them with immediate funding on demand. These commitments are recorded off-balance sheet and account for around 50 per cent of total liquidity creation at commercial banks (Berger and Bouwman, 2009 ). Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) argue that as long as deposit withdrawals and credit line drawdowns are sufficiently uncorrelated, banks can enjoy cost reduction synergies from promising immediate liquidity to both parties at the same time. They show that this simultaneous liquidity insurance role of banks reduces their need to hold liquid assets. Banks need not hold a large sum of liquid assets to meet uncertain liquidity demands from their customers. That is, deposits can be used to hedge drawdown risk from commitments. Gatev and Strahan (2006) provide evidence consistent with this conjecture using US data. For this reason, banks are considered to have a natural advantage over other financial intermediaries in insuring investors and borrowers against their uncertain liquidity requirements (Acharya and Mora, 2015) . They provide liquidity to 2 businesses and households via backup lines of credit, loan commitments and transactions deposits, all of which permit customers to obtain cash on demand.
In this paper, we argue that the ability of banks to hedge asset-side liquidity risk with deposits is only possible in the presence of deposit insurance. Accordingly, we employ IMF crisis episodes to proxy for market-wide shocks to liquidity and examine the differential responses by banks in countries with and without deposit insurance. Consistent this our argument, we document that banks reduce lending by less during a crisis if they have access to deposit insurance. Further, this effect is concentrated in banks more reliant on core deposit funding. Our baseline estimates suggest that deposit insurance dampens the contraction in loan growth by approximately 57%. We also report that banks tend to experience an inflow of deposits when a crisis hits -a flight to safety -only in the presence of deposit insurance.
Our paper is related to two steams of literature. First, it is related to bank liquidity risk management literature. Following the theoretical work of Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) who implicitly assume that deposits are insured whereas other forms of debt are not, researchers have taken for granted that the diversification benefits arising from the simultaneous provision of liability and asset side liquidity stems from explicit government guarantees on bank deposits that have come about over the past 70 years. Despite this, there has been little attempt to determine whether the presence of deposit insurance is the reason why banks have an advantage in providing off-balance sheet credit in comparison to other institutions since all the studies have focused on the US. For example, while Gatev and Strahan (2006) agree that it is the implicit support from the government that explains inflows of deposits into the banking system, they do not provide any empirical evidence for this notion. Similarly, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Cornett et al., (2011) find that the 'run' on banks during the recent US crisis was predominantly by wholesale 3 depositors, repo lenders and contingent borrowers instead of retail, insured depositors. These studies provide evidence that banks that relied more heavily on short-term debt and those that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns were forced to cut lending during the crisis. Our paper fills the gap by being the first to present systematic empirical evidence for the role of deposit insurance in mitigating the credit supply contraction resulting from a financial crisis.
Our findings are similar in spirit to a study by Pennacchi (2006) who uses pre-FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) data to examine whether the results of Gatev and Strahan (2006) hold, prior to existence deposit insurance in the US. He shows that banks did not maintain lending during the great depression in the absence of deposit insurance. In fact, Pennacchi (2009) does not find inflow of deposits into banks in periods of crisis during the pre-FDIC period. His findings, along with ours, cast doubt on the notion that it is the simultaneous provision of liquidity to depositors and borrowers that enables banks to efficiently perform their asset transformation function due to an inherent specialness of banks, even in the absence of insurance. Our paper highlights the important role of deposit insurance in dampening the credit contraction effects of liquidity crises episodes. 1 The second stream of literature our paper is related to is the literature studying the costs and benefits of deposit insurance. Since the seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) espousing the benefits of deposit insurance due to its ability to mitigate bank runs, the literature 1 Note however, Acharya and Mora (2015) report that, at the onset of the GFC, more than 62% of all deposits in the US were not covered by the deposit insurance. They claim that, while banks were able to honour their ex-ante loan commitments during the crisis, this was possible only because of substantial support from the government and the Fed expanding its balance sheet. Further, Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) show that deposit insurance did not diminish depositor incentives to withdraw deposits during crises in Argentina, Chile and Mexico. These casts doubt on the extent to which deposit insurance schemes have been effective in ensuring banks' lending efficiency during crises.
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has focused on the pricing of insurance (e.g. Ronn and Verma, 1986; Chan and Greenbaum, 1992) , the moral hazard and risk shifting incentives of deposit insurance (e.g. Keeley, 1990; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995) and thus impact on overall financial stability (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004) , and the mechanisms that might ameliorate moral hazard issues (e.g. on capital regulation, see Buser, Chen and Kane, 1981) . In contrast, our paper one of the few to estimate the benefits of deposit insurance in mitigating supply side shocks on the economy. While mispriced deposit insurance maybe inefficient ex-ante, we show that it may in fact be ex-post efficient.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of deposit insurance and a description of how key features of insurance schemes differ around the world. Section 3 describes our data. Sections 4 and 5 describe the empirical model and summary statistics respectively. Section 6 discusses the results of the benchmark specification. Section 7 addresses the robustness of the results. Section 8 concludes with implications and future directions.
Deposit Insurance
Deposit insurance was first implemented by the US government in 1934 in response to the bank runs that occurred during the Great Depression. Since then, it has found its way into many other countries around the world, all of which now offer some form of depositor protection (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) .
Whether the insurance is funded by the banking sector (regular premiums) and/or the government (taxpayer money), the burden of this insurance is shared within the economy. 
Data and Sample
We combine data on bank financial statements, episodes of systemic banking crisis, deposit insurance schemes and the macroeconomic environment. Individual bank data are obtained from Thus, we implicitly assume that once the deposit insurance scheme is introduced, it is not turned off within the period of analysis.
Country-level macroeconomic data are obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators dataset. These variables are not included in any of the main regression models and instead form part of our robustness checks.
Empirical approach
Several factors affect the ability of banks to lend during crises such as bank specialization, liquidity risk exposure at the onset of the crisis, presence of prudential bank regulation, institutional stability and macroeconomic environment. Among these, we wish to highlight the role of explicit deposit insurance schemes.
A simple regression of deposit insurance against bank lending would not be sufficient to identify the correlation between the two. However, this relationship is unlikely to be causal. By exploiting the fact that banking crises hit different countries at different times, we attempt to identify the causal impact by contrasting net lending growth of banks with and without deposit insurance, before and during periods of liquidity crisis. This strategy is based on the presumption that banking crises are uncorrelated with the distribution of deposit insurance across countries. To investigate the causal relationship, we estimate a difference-in-differences model of the following holdings of liquid assets and to shrink loan growth more than banks with low liquidity risk exposure (Cornett et al., 2011) . We control for this relationship by interacting the crisis variable with certain measures of liquidity risk exposure. These controls for liquidity risk, given by 's, are bank-specific and measured at the start of the year. Hence, the variables reflect the banks' exposure to liquidity risk at the onset of the crisis. The five control for these risks include i. Market liquidity of assets measured as liquid assets as a proportion of total assets. Liquid assets include cash holdings, deposits at and receipts due from other banks, government securities and trading securities.
ii. Reliance on deposit financing measured as the sum of current and savings deposits as a proportion of total assets. We do not include term deposits in our construction of core deposits variable because not all countries have coverage for term deposits. iii. Equity as a fraction of financial structure measured as the ratio of equity capital to total assets. This variable measures the percentage of total assets financed by equity capital, which is considered to be one of the stable sources of finance.
iv.
Unused commitments ratio measured as committed credit lines as a proportion of the sum of total assets and committed credit lines.
v. Bank size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. This variable is intended to capture differences in bank lending capacity. It also controls for the "too-big-to-fail" effect which suggests that large banks have significantly lower solvency risk than other banks as they enjoy implicit government protection at all times. Hence, the log of total assets also accounts for this too-big-to-fail effect, which acts in much the same way as deposit insurance for large banks in countries without explicit deposit insurance.
Next, we add a dummy variable for deposit insurance which takes the value 1 if the country (bank) has an explicit deposit insurance scheme. We then interact the deposit insurance dummy with the crisis dummy to isolate the impact of deposit insurance on bank lending during crises.
Banks with deposit insurance are expected to attract funds from depositors during periods of crises due to explicit government guarantee. This enables these banks to fund takedown demand from unused loan commitments which tend to be drawn heavily during crises. We therefore hypothesize banks with deposit insurance to be less concerned with building up liquidity on their balance sheet and therefore reduce new lending by less than their otherwise identical counterparts. As such, we expect the coefficient on the interaction between crisis and deposit insurance, given by 3 , to be positive and significant.
We include time fixed effects to sweep out aggregate trends and control for variation in lending growth over time that is common to all banks in the sample. We also use bank fixed effects 9 to control for mean differences in lending growth across banks. That is, bank fixed effects control for time-invariant heterogeneity across banks. Ideally, we would use country-year fixed effects in order to allow for time trends to be different across countries. However, some countries in our sample do not vary in their deposit insurance variable over the sample period. 6 Country-year fixed effects would, therefore, wipe out the deposit insurance signal for these countries, which is undesirable. Country-year fixed effects would also be perfectly correlated with the crisis variable and therefore make the identification strategy redundant.
Both deposit insurance and crisis variables are determined at the country level, whereas the dependent variable is determined at the individual bank level. Thus, we consistently use HuberWhite standard errors clustered at the country level to allow for potential serial correlation across banks within a country. Not doing so might result in inflated test statistics, increasing the likelihood of finding significant results even if there may actually not be any significance. The average growth in net lending for the sample is 5.1% while the median is 3.2%, suggesting that the lending variable is positively skewed. The banks in the sample fund their asset base, on average, using 22.4% core deposits, 10% equity capital, 15.8% liquid assets. The average bank exposure to undrawn loan commitments in any given period is 7.1% of its commitments and asset base combined. From Table 2 , notice that this figure coincides with the average exposure to loan commitments faced by banks with deposit insurance. The median exposure to commitments faced by banks without deposit insurance is 3.5%, which is lower than the median exposure of 5.6% faced by banks with deposit insurance. Further, notice that the observations available for this measure is significantly lower than observations available for other measures for banks without insurance. Looking back at the four bank categories chosen for the sample, this missing data might suggest that banks that do not have deposit insurance do not lend via commitments in the first place.
Summary statistics
Results
We formally begin our analysis by replicating the empirical model used by Cornett et al. (2011) to investigate the impact of liquidity risk exposure on loan growth during crisis. Their model is identical to the one specified in the methodology above, except that it does not include deposit insurance as one of the explanatory variables. The first column of Table 3 reports the results for this specification.
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The coefficient on the interaction between core deposits and crisis is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that, on average, banks that enter into the crisis with greater core deposit financing reduce lending by less than banks with more reliance on short-term wholesale funding (the omitted category). Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton (2009) show that market for wholesale funds collapsed during the GFC. They argue that, as lending becomes riskier, repo lenders demand more collateral to back their loans. At the same time, holders of commercial paper also refuse to roll over their debt causing the market for commercial paper to dry up. This significantly reduces the sources of liquid funds accessible to banks. This argument coincides with the results from this regression, implying that as funding from short-term money market becomes unavailable, insured deposits step in to provide a stable source of capital for banks to sustain lending during crisis.
The coefficient on the interaction between loan commitments and crisis is negative and also statistically significant. This result confirms the conjecture that banks with greater exposure to credit line drawdowns at the onset of banking panic cut back on lending by more than banks with relatively low exposure to these off-balance sheet assets. Combined with the positive coefficient on the interaction between core deposits and crisis, the results also lend support to the findings of Gatev and Strahan (2006) , who argue that core deposits hedge liquidity risk arising from unused loan commitments during banking panic. That is, banks with higher levels of core deposits are better able to fund credit lines that firms choose to draw on heavily during market stress.
The interaction between equity and crisis and that between liquid assets and crisis enter into the regression with positive effect, implying that banks with higher levels of equity capital and liquid assets are better able to sustain lending during episodes of market-wide scramble for 12 liquidity. It is interesting to note that the findings presented in the existing literature, which focuses primarily on the United States, also hold true in the global context.
The second column of Table 3 adds deposit insurance and its interaction with banking crisis as explanatory variables into the existing model, which becomes the benchmark specification of this research. The expectation here is to find a significantly positive coefficient on the interaction term, which we interpret as the causal effect of deposit insurance on bank lending during crises.
The results of the benchmark regression suggest that a crisis causes banks without deposit insurance to reduce their lending growth by 0.089 percentage points whereas it causes banks with deposit insurance to reduce lending growth by 0.038 percentage points. The difference between the two is given by the coefficient on the interaction of deposit insurance with crisis of 0.051 (i.e.
deposit insurance dampens the contraction in lending by about 57%). It is interesting to note that the coefficients on all variables (except for crisis) in the second column have almost the same magnitude as in the first column. The coefficient on crisis, however, has strengthened from -0.039 to -0.089. This implies that the impact of crises on net lending is understated in the first model as the coefficient is capturing some of the effect of deposit insurance, which is not accounted for in the first specification. Table 4 divides the sample of 16,120 banks into those with deposit insurance and those without it, and implements the specification used by Cornett et al. (2011) on the two subsamples.
If deposit insurance matters, then the sensitivity of core deposits to net lending during crises must be higher for banks with deposit insurance as compared to those banks without deposit insurance.
The results from Table 4 suggest that core deposits have a no effect on bank lending during crises in countries without explicit deposit insurance schemes. Whereas, banks in countries with deposit insurance are able to hedge the reduction in lending resulting from liquidity crises with greater 13 holdings of core deposits at the onset of crises. Notice, however, that there is a stark difference in the sample size for the two regressions (124,765 for regression using banks with deposit insurance versus 4,217 for regression using banks without deposit insurance). Looking back at the summary statistics in Table 1 and 2 indicates that this is happening due to missing observations for loan commitments-to-total assets ratio, which mainly involve banks without deposit insurance.
Since this raises concerns regarding the statistical power of the regression, we re-estimate the model for the two subsamples without the loan commitments ratio to see if the results change significantly. These results are presented in Appendix 2.1. The negative impact of crisis on bank lending is now significant for banks without deposit insurance while the coefficient on the interaction of core deposits with crisis is still insignificant. The results for banks with deposit insurance do not change much. These findings render support for our hypothesis that deposits are only safe during crises if banks have deposit insurance. In the absence of deposit insurance, banks may face runs from depositors, forcing them to increase/retain liquidity on their balance sheets and thus displacing their lending capacity. The results, therefore, explicitly confirm what existing papers take as given.
Robustness Checks
Coverage Limit
Since majority of the observations in the sample correspond to the deposit insurance value of 1, it might be more prudent to use an alternative measure of deposit insurance to allow more variation and see if the effect still holds. If it does not, then the results using the deposit insurance dummy may be driven by a lack of observations with no deposit insurance.
14 One measure of deposit insurance that would allow us to get more variation is the level of insurance coverage set by the authority in every country. We use the ratio of insurance coverage limit to GDP per capita of the country for every given year, as a proxy for the extensiveness of coverage. This is because coverage limit data is available only in domestic currency and hence we divide it by the domestic currency GDP per capita to standardize and compare the limits across countries. For example, if a country has a coverage limit of $250,000 per depositor and a GDP per capita of $50,000, then the ratio of coverage limit to GDP per capita is 5. In order to account for banks with no deposit insurance, the coverage limit for them has been set to equal 0. The ratio ranges from 0 to 87.9 for banks in our sample. Some countries have full/unlimited coverage in which case the data for the coverage ratio cannot be obtained. Hence, these observations are excluded from the sample.
It may be argued that countries increase/change their insurance coverage levels in response to crises. In this sense, coverage limit ratio would be an outcome of the crisis making it a bad measure of deposit insurance. In order to test if this is a big concern, we collapse the data to country level and regress coverage ratio against crisis with country fixed effects on the sample of banks with explicit deposit insurance. The results show a statistically insignificant coefficient on crisis at 10% level. This suggests that, while few countries may have responded to the recent GFC by increasing the statutory coverage limits of their respective deposit insurance schemes (DemirgucKunt, Kane and Laeven, 2014), this does not seem to be the general trend over all the crisis periods from 1986 to 2011. Hence, using coverage limit as the explanatory variable does not interfere with the exogeneity of crisis.
The first column of Table 5 shows the results of the benchmark model with the coverage limit as the measure of deposit insurance. The negative coefficient on the interaction between 15 coverage limit and crisis suggests that, on average, banks with high coverage limits are expected to reduce lending by more than banks with relatively low coverage limits. The negative relationship identified is maintained when loan commitments are excluded from the model (Appendix 3.1 -Column 1) or when country level control variables are included in the model (Appendix 3.2 -Column 1).
It seems reasonable, however, to expect higher coverage limit to be more beneficial for banks with higher reliance on core deposit financing. A model with triple interaction of core deposits, crisis and coverage limit might therefore be a better way to disentangle this relationship.
The second column of Table 5 reports the results from the regression with a triple interaction. The coefficient on the triple interaction term is positive and statistically significant. This supports the conjecture that the benefits from the high coverage limits offered by the corresponding deposit insurance scheme during times of crisis are concentrated in banks that are more reliant on core deposit funding. While the coefficient on the interaction between coverage limit and crisis is still negative in this specification (-0.01), the positive coefficient on the triple interaction term (0.02) more than offsets this negative effect. Further, notice that the coefficient on the interaction between core deposits and crisis is significantly positive in the first column but becomes insignificant when we account for the triple interaction in the second column. Once again, the results hold regardless of whether loan commitments are excluded from the model (Appendix 3.1 -Column 2) or country level control variables are included in the model (Appendix 3.2 -Column 2).
Another possible way to account for coverage limit is to divide the sample into above and below median levels of coverage. In this sense, one of the samples includes banks that have coverage ratios between 0 and 2.62 while the other sample includes banks that have coverage ratios ranging from 2.62 to 87.6. Running the regression model on the two subsamples (Table 6 ), we find 16 that the sensitivity of net lending to core deposits during crisis is higher for banks with high insurance coverage. This is given by a statistically significant coefficient of 0.061 on the interaction of core deposits with crisis for banks with high coverage as compared to the coefficient of 0.049 for banks with low coverage. Further, notice that the coefficients for the two subsamples are exactly the same once loan commitments are excluded (Appendix 4.1). The difference is positive but lower when country variables are included (Appendix 4.2).
Country Variables
Since we use difference-in-differences specification to identify the causal effect of deposit insurance on bank lending during crises, it is important to ensure that the assumptions that underpin such an empirical specification are justified. As mentioned previously, several factors can potentially affect banks' lending behaviour during periods of market-wide liquidity crisis. These factors, while mainly bank-level, could also be country-level. CPI inflation and growth of GDP per capita are two standard variables that researchers use widely to capture time-variant heterogeneity across countries. Growth rate of GDP per capita controls for potential drop in demand for loans during crisis. Hence, this variable is used as an indicator of prospects for borrowers, which in turn determine the profitability of bank lending. Inflation, on the other hand, accounts for changes in price level and hence allows the analysis to focus on real outcomes.
Besides growth of GDP per capita and inflation, it seems particularly important to account usable observations is due to the data for growth in money supply available only from 1988, which implies that the regression with country variables forgoes the first two years of data.
Parallel Trends
In order to identify the causal effect of deposit insurance on bank lending during crisis, it is necessary to ensure that, prior to the crisis, banks with and without deposit insurance have parallel growth of net loans. Only when a crisis hits should this lending behaviour change between the two bank types. We conduct an event study to test this crucial assumption. To do this, we first redefine the crisis variable to be the first year of crisis. Based on this analysis, the parallel trends assumption does not hold prior to crises coming into effect, implying that the effect that the benchmark model is capturing is a combination of the true effect of deposit insurance and the effect of certain time-variant unobservables that affect the two types of banks differently. This seems to suggest that the model does not causally identify the effect of deposit insurance on lending growth during crises. 7 However, the coefficients on the interaction between deposit insurance and lag indicators, given by 's, suggest that the impact of deposit insurance is significantly positive in the second and third year after the crisis, significantly negative in the fourth year after the crisis, beyond which the effect fades away. One way of interpreting these dynamics is that deposit insurance helps only temporarily. While the negative sign on 4 is not ideal, the fact that 2 and 3 are positive is quite promising.
As a sensitivity test, we re-estimate the parallel trends equation without the loan commitments ratio to check if the results change significantly. Figure 3 (Appendix 5 -Column 2) depicts the point estimates on the interaction of deposit insurance with the leads and lags from this specification. Notice that the 95% confidence intervals for all 's include zero and are therefore statistically insignificant. This indicates that, prior to the crisis, there is nothing that affects the lending of banks with and without deposit insurance differently. In this sense, the parallel trends hold and the benchmark specification (excluding loan commitments ratio) identifies the causal effect of deposit insurance on loan growth during crisis. Based on the theory, it seems unreasonable to exclude loan commitments when it is the liquidity risk stemming from these commitments that core deposits hedge during crises. If, however, banks that do not have deposit insurance tend not to lend via loan commitments, then the model without loan commitments ratio would be superior to the benchmark specification.
Deposit flow
Finally, to establish that our result is driven by the fact the deposit insurance provides a safe haven for depositors during times of market stress, as we suppose, we investigate whether we observe higher deposit inflows into banks operating in countries with insurance schemes during crises. To that end, we estimate a difference-in-difference regression of deposit growth similar to 21 equation (1). We control for bank size, liquidity and capitalization and include bank and year fixed-effects as before. We include our crisis and deposit insurance indicators along with the interaction between the two. The results are reported in Appendix 6. We find that the interaction between CRISIS and DI is positive and significant, suggesting that banks in countries with deposit insurance, on average, experience higher deposit growth during crises compared to those without deposit insurance. This finding is consistent with our overall explanation for the higher loan growth during crises for banks with access to insurance schemes.
Conclusion
Past research has shown that deposit insurance schemes tend to increase the ex-ante probability of banking crises. This paper attempts to investigate whether, conditioned on a crisis occurring, deposit insurance mitigates the negative impact of the crisis. That is, although being exante inefficient, insurance schemes may be ex-post efficient. Using data for systemic banking crises and individual bank financials across the world, this paper conducts a difference-indifferences analysis to isolate the effect of deposit insurance on bank lending during crises. The results render support in favour of the hypothesis, suggesting that deposit insurance helps banks sustain lending during crises. The findings also indicate that, on average, a higher coverage limit could be beneficial, especially if it is associated with higher levels of funding from core deposits.
Overall, the results offer support for the hypothesis laid by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , who argue that deposit insurance has an important role to play in preventing bank runs during periods of market panic. While banks experience influx of deposits during crises, this is only possible due to explicit backing of deposit accounts by the government in the form of deposit insurance. This, 22 in turn, enables banks to fund synchronized drawdowns of loan commitments that occur during episodes of market-wide liquidity dry-up.
This paper is the first attempt to explicitly test the role of deposit insurance in liquidity risk management during crises. While deposit insurance may increase moral hazard and likelihood of bank failure in the period leading up to the crisis, it can also help prevent widespread bank runs during crises. Despite limitations, this paper presents suggestive evidence that deposit insurance schemes allow banks to buffer liquidity shocks and continue lending in times of market stress. The results suggest that loan growth can be sustained only in the presence of deposit insurance. This implies that deposit insurance, while costly to implement, appears to provide banks, governments and the economy with substantial benefits during a crisis. Table 3 Column (1) replicates the model used by Cornett et al. (2011) . It reports difference-in-differences regression of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, bank characteristics and interactions. Column (2) adds deposit insurance indicator and its interaction with crisis indicator as explanatory variables into this model. Both regressions utilize an unbalanced panel of 16,120 banks across 172 countries, observed yearly over the period 1986 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***. Table 4 Column (1) replicates the model used by Cornett et al. (2011) for countries without an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Column (2) does the same for countries with an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Both columns report difference-in-differences regressions of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, bank characteristics and interactions. The regression utilizes an unbalanced panel of 16,120 banks across 172 countries, observed yearly over the period 1986 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***. Table 5 This table reports difference-in-differences regressions of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, deposit insurance coverage limit, bank characteristics and interactions. Column (1) uses simple interaction between coverage limit and crisis, whereas column (2) adds triple interaction between coverage limit, crisis and core deposits. The regression utilizes an unbalanced panel of 16,052 banks across 170 countries, observed yearly over the period 1986 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***.
Dependant variable: ∆Net Loanst/Assetst-1 (1) Table 6 This table divides the sample into above and below median ratio of coverage limit-to-GDP per capita. It reports difference-in-differences regressions of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, bank characteristics and interactions. Column (1) shows the regression results for banks with 'high' coverage (coverage ratio > 2.62), whereas column (2) shows the results for banks with 'low' coverage (coverage ratio ≤ 2.62). The regression utilizes an unbalanced panel of 16,120 banks across 172 countries, observed yearly over the period 1986 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***.
Dependant variable: ∆Net Loanst/Assetst-1 (1) Table 3 without the ratio of loan commitments to sum of loan commitments and total assets.
Column (1) replicates the model used by Cornett et al. (2011) . It reports difference-in-differences regression of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, banks characteristics and interactions. Column (2) adds deposit insurance indicator and its interaction with crisis indicator as explanatory variables into this model. Both regressions utilize an unbalanced panel of 20,980 banks across 194 countries, observed yearly over the period 1986 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***. Table 3 with country level variables.
Column (1) replicates the model used by Cornett et al. (2011) . It reports difference-in-differences regression of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, banks characteristics and interactions. Column (2) adds deposit insurance indicator and its interaction with crisis indicator as explanatory variables into this model. Both regressions utilize an unbalanced panel of 15,539 banks across 153 countries, observed yearly over the period 1990 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***.
∆Net Loanst/Assetst-1 (1) Table 4 without the ratio of loan commitments to sum of loan commitments and total assets.
Column (1) replicates the model used by Cornett et al. (2011) for countries without an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Column (2) does the same for countries with an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Both columns report difference-in-differences regressions of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, banks characteristics and interactions. The regression utilizes an unbalanced panel of 20,980 banks across 194 countries, observed yearly over the period 1986 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***.
Dependant variable: ∆Net Loanst/Assetst-1 (1) Table 4 with country level variables.
Column (1) replicates the model used by Cornett et al. (2011) for countries without an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Column (2) does the same for countries with an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Both columns report difference-in-differences regressions of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, banks characteristics and interactions. The regression utilizes an unbalanced panel of 15,539 banks across 153 countries, observed yearly over the period 1986 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***.
Dependant variable: ∆Net Loanst/Assetst-1 (1) Table 5 without the ratio of loan commitments to sum of loan commitments and total assets. This table reports difference-in-differences regressions of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, deposit insurance coverage limit, banks characteristics and interactions. Column (1) uses simple interaction between coverage limit and crisis, whereas column (2) adds triple interaction between coverage limit, crisis and core deposits. The regression utilizes an unbalanced panel of 20,874 banks across 193 countries, observed yearly over the period 1986 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***. Table 5 with country level variables.
This table reports difference-in-differences regressions of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, deposit insurance coverage limit, banks characteristics and interactions. Column (1) uses simple interaction between coverage limit and crisis, whereas column (2) adds triple interaction between coverage limit, crisis and core deposits. The regression utilizes an unbalanced panel of 15,484 banks across 153 countries, observed yearly over the period 1990 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***. Table 6 without the ratio of loan commitments to sum of loan commitments and total assets.
This table divides the sample into above and below median ratio of coverage limit-to-GDP per capita. It reports difference-in-differences regressions of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, bank characteristics and interactions. Column (1) shows the regression results for banks with 'high' coverage (coverage ratio > 2.62), whereas column (2) shows the results for banks with 'low' coverage (coverage ratio ≤ 2.62). The regression utilizes an unbalanced panel of 20,874 banks across 193 countries, observed yearly over the period 1986 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***. Table 6 with country variables.
This table divides the sample into above and below median ratio of coverage limit-to-GDP per capita. It reports difference-in-differences regressions of change in lending (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, bank characteristics and interactions. Column (1) shows the regression results for banks with 'high' coverage (coverage ratio > 2.62), whereas column (2) shows the results for banks with 'low' coverage (coverage ratio ≤ 2.62). The regression utilizes an unbalanced panel of 15,484 banks across 153 countries, observed yearly over the period 1990 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***. This table reports difference-in-differences regressions of change in core deposits (standardized by beginning of period assets) on crisis indicator, deposit insurance coverage limit, bank characteristics and interactions. The regression utilizes an unbalanced panel of 16,052 banks across 170 countries, observed yearly over the period 1986 through 2011. Banks with more than 150% growth in total assets over any given year are excluded from the sample to account for mergers and acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. HuberWhite robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are used to allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across banks within each country. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***.
∆Core 
Bank fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
